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Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham: The Police
Power and the Individual in a Changing World
William F. Duker*
"[A111 men, however great and however honest, are almost necessarily affected by the general belief of their times."
Rufus W. Peckham,
People u. Budd.'

In searching out the origins and legitimacy of "liberty of
contract," Roscoe Pound concluded that the concept had no legitimate foundation and was created by an act of judicial usurpation.' Pound posited a number of reasons for the establishment of the concept," but failed to take notice of the most
salient: liberty of contract was articulated in response to legislation designed to meet the conditions of the new industrial state.
Individual liberty was threatened from two fronts: the new industrial entity and government's response to it.
This was the dilemma confronted by Rufus W. Peckham,
associate justice of the New York Court of Appeals from 1887 to
1895 and Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
from 1896 to 1909. Peckham's approach to this problem is the
subject of this Article.
Peckham is probably best remembered for setting the occasion for Mr. Justice Holmes' often quoted critique of the Fuller
Court's activist conception of the judicial role. In his dissent in
Lochner v. New York,' Holmes charged that the majority opinion was founded "upon an economic theory which a large part of
* B.A., 1976, State University of New York at Albany; Ph.D., 1978, University of
Cambridge.
1. 117 N.Y. 1, 47, 22 N.E. 670, 686, 78'N.Y.S. App. 185, 201 (1889) (Peckham, J.,
dissenting).
2. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALEL.J. 454, 454-58 (1909).
3. Id. at 457.
4. 198 US. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the country [did] not entertain."' Holmes argued that the term
"liberty" as employed in the fourteenth amendment was not intended to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social static^."^ The
"constitution [was] not intended to embody a particular economic theory;" rather, it was "made for people of fundamentally
different views."' In support of his thesis, Holrnes pointed to antitrust policy and traditional uses of the police power sanctioned
by the Court.
Despite Peckham's adherence to the liberty of contract theory, he had little difficulty upholding traditional uses of the police power8 and was the Court's most articulate spokesman in
5. Id. at 75.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 74-76.
8. In North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), Peckham, speaking for the Court, rejected a challenge to a municipal code insofar as it allowed the
city-without providing for a prior hearing-to seize, condemn, or destroy food unfit for
human consumption. Such power was determined to inhere in a state's right and duty to
safeguard the lives and health of its inhabitants. Whether to allow a prior hearing was in
Peckham's opinion a legislative determination. Consequently, the Court had no reason to
consider the economic interest involved. The state presumptively had the right and duty
to seize and to destroy unwholesome food. Id. at 320-21.
In Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900), which involved a city ordinance forbidding the sale of cigarettes without a license, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Peckham, held that unless such regulations were "so utterly unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the property and personal rights of the citizen are
unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with," they fell within the
proper exercise of a state's police power. Id. at 188. See also Welch v. Swasey, 214 US.
91 (1908) (sustaining a state's zoning power); Phillips v. City of Mobile, 208 U.S. 472
(1908) (validating licensing fees charged breweries); Martin v. Trout, 199 US. 212 (1905)
(upholding a state law suppressing gambling).
Peckham's opinions involving the power of eminent domain, a power closely related
to the police power, also reflect the great deference Peckham generally accorded legislative judgments. In United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 US. 668 (1896), a railroad
company whose land was being condemned for the erection of a war monument challenged the government's exercise of its eminent domain power. In upholding the government's exercise of power, Peckham, in a burst of patriotism applauded by the profession,
wrote:
Any act of Congress which plainly and directly tends to enhance the respect
and love of the citizen for the institutions of his country and to quicken and
strengthen his motives to defend them, and which is germane to and intimately connected with and appropriate to the exercise of some one or all of the
powers granted by Congress must be valid.
Id. at 681. Again writing for the Court in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 US.
112 (1896), Justice Peckham upheld a California statute permitting the establishment of
local irrigation districts empowered to exercise eminent domain and to assess all landowners in the district for the support of irrigation projects. The great deference shown
state authorities in Fallbrook was also evident in Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905),
where Peckham and the Court, in determining whether a state statute permitting condemnation by an individual for the purpose of obtaining water for his own land could be
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implementing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Peckham not only
recognized limits to liberty of contract, he also rejected the manipulation of laissez-faire economics and "Social Darwinism" by
a few articulate captains of industry.@Thus when the term "laissez-faire" is invoked to describe the judicial philosophy of
Peckham, either the term must be reduced to its quintessential
meaning, or it must be rejected as inaccurate. Peckham was not
a spokesman for big business. And even though an instrumentalist's analysis of Peckham's liberty of contract decisions might
discredit this claim, such an approach would later uncover a paradox when used to examine his antitrust opinions. Moreover,
Peckham is of interest here as an intellectual force, not as a political, social, or psychological character. This Article attempts
to identify Peckham's "master idea," or the concept giving guidance to Peckham's opinions. The focus is on the idea itself. Instrumentalism, which focuses on the effect of an idea, and motivational inquiry, which focuses on the causes for the formulation
of the idea, are beyond the scope of this Article.
What was the master idea of Rufus W. Peckham? The jurisconstrued as a condemnation for a public use, observed that "what is a public use may
frequently and largely depend upon the facts surrounding the subject, and . . . the people of a State, as also its courts, must in the nature of things be more familiar with such
facts." Id. a t 369.
Peckham decreed that the exercise of the police power was illegitimate in the following circumstances: where a licensing fee or utility rate was shown to be unreasonable (to
Peckham this was tantamount to taking property without just compensation), Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904) (confiscatory rates unconstitutional);
where the police power ran afoul of congressional power over interstate commerce, Atlantic Coastal Line R.R. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328 (1907) (stoppage of interstate trains);
Central of Ga. Ry. v. Murphy, 196 U.S. 195 (1905) (interstate shipment of goods); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) (sale of oleomargarine); or where the congressional power over patents had been interfered with, Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347
(1906). In the commerce clause and patent cases the police power gave way to requirements of federal supremacy. In the utility rate cases the police power gave way to the
just compensation clause where the party challenging the rates demonstrated the unreasonableness ,of the rate or fee.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), involved a nontraditional application
of the police power. A majority of the Court relied on the police power to sustain legislation requiring compulsory vaccination of adults. Although such regulations had been upheld when applied to children, the application to adults was novel. Because Peckham
dissented without opinion, his position is impossible to explain-with complete certainty.
However, the case was handed down shortly before Lochner, and Peckham's position in
Jacobson is consistent with the theory of Lochner. T o Peckham, the compulsory vaccination law must have appeared to be a paternalistic and meddlesome interference with
individual liberty.
9. Wyllie, Social Darwinism and the Businessman, 103 PROC.AM. PHILOSOPHICAL.
SOC'Y629 (1959).

50

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

prudence of Peckham was rooted in a philosophical conception
of individual liberty and a supporting political conception of the
role of government that placed considerable emphasis on the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government. In short, the best government was the least government. Trust was placed in the free individual, who, if left
unfettered by needless governmental regulation, would grow
more intelligent and more attuned to the moral law, thereby decreasing the need for government.1° The judiciary was set up as
a check on unnecessary governmental interference in the affairs
of the individual. It was this conception of the judicial role that
distinguished Peckham from Holmes. While Holmes was unwilling to identify public values and preferred to leave their identification to the democratic branches, Peckham employed judicial
office to discern and announce substantive values.ll
If any economic interest was favored by Peckham, it was
that of the "rugged individual." But for Peckham that preference remained neutral, since the rugged individual was favored
by nature. Government should neither aid nor hinder his survival. Liberty required equal treatment, and equal opportunity
was assured only in the absence of illegal combinations of economic power. Peckham's support for antitrust policy was thus
consistent with his belief in limited government. Governmental
intervention to check monopolies and other concentrations of economic power was designed to restore a situation in which the
free individual could once again prevail without governmental
intervention.
Analysis commences with an examination of Peckham's liberty of contract decisions while a member of the New York
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Juxtaposed to these cases are Peckham's antitrust opinions. What
emerges is the portrait of a judge attempting to cope with the
problems of a new industrial state in a classical liberal manner-a negative rather than positive approach. By this approach
the majoritarian branches could eliminate dangerous concentrations of economic power, but they could not interfere on the individual's behalf to equalize the bargaining relationship.
10. S. FINE,LAISSEZ
FAIRE
AND THE GENERALWELFARE
STATE
5 (1956).
11. There is certainly no indication that Peckham perceived constitutional law to be
stagnant. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra.
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In Munn v. Illin~is,'~
the United States Supreme Court rejected an attack on a state law regulating the storage rates of
grain elevators. The grain elevator owners argued that the regulation of storage prices deprived them of the use of their property without due process of law. Chief Justice Waite's majority
opinion emphasized that the scope of the state's police power
encompassed the regulation of private property when such regulation was necessary for the public good. Justice Field's dissent
argued that the term "liberty" as used in the fourteenth amendment meant something more than freedom from physical restraint. It included the freedom to use one's property without
undue governmental interference.l8
Although Field's dissent in Munn remained a minority view
on the Supreme Court for twenty years, an increasing number of
state courts later adopted it. The position was first and foremost
a statement on governmental power. It was a position that conceptualized the role of the judiciary as a check between legislative power and the individual. Its chief exponent on the New
York Court of Appeals between 1887 and 1895 was Rufus W.
Peckham. Peckham's more famous opinions in Lochner14 and
Allgeyer v. Louisiana16 were no surprise to those familiar with
his record on the New York Court of Appeals.
In People u. Gil1son,l6 Peckham, speaking on behalf of the
entire court, invalidated a provision of the state penal code
prohibiting the sale of food or any offer to sell upon a representation or inducement that something else would be provided as a
gift, prize, premium, or reward to the purchaser. The provision,
allegedly part of the state's efforts to regulate lotteries, was employed by the state against the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (A
& P) for offering a teacup and saucer to a purchaser of coffee.
A & P attempted to distinguish its sales method from the
typical lottery scheme by arguing that the statute's effect was
"to oppress a certain class of citizen traders, and to improperly
discriminate against them in their business, and thereby restrict,
and so virtually prohibit their use of their own property."17 The
12. 94 U S . 113 (1876).
13. Id. at 142-43(Field, J., dissenting).
14. See notes 53-56and accompanying text infra.
15. 165 U.S.578 (1897).
16. 109 N.Y. 389, 17 N.E. 343, 72 N.Y.S. App. at 819 (1888).
17. Id. at 390 (not included in parallel sources).
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state responded that the law was a valid exercise of police power
in that it sought to regulate trade in impure, unwholesome, and
adulterated food, and to prevent fraud and deception.
Peckham's decision limiting the state's exercise of police
power began with an analysis of the scope of judicial review. After paying homage to the supremacy clause, the presumption of
constitutionality, and the police power, and after acknowledging
the impropriety of judicial veto based merely upon natural justice and equity,18 Peckham announced that
a person living under our Constitution has the right to adopt
and follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the
community, as he may see fit. The term "liberty" as used in
the Constitution is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen as by incarceration,
but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the
enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by
his creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare. Liberty, in its broad sense, as understood
in this country, means the right not only of freedom from servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use
his faculties in all lawful ways to live and work where he will,
to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any
lawful trade or avocation.lS

In Peckham's view the statute under review violated this liberty.
He could not see that the statute had anything to do with unwholesome food. Nor could he accept the proposition that the
statute was needed to safeguard the customer from buying more
than he needed. Although it was within the legislative domain to
determine what laws and regulations were needed to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare, it was the duty of the judiciary to insure that the means taken by the legislature had a direct relation to a legitimate end?' Thus Gillson was similar to
Lochner: in Lochner the state sought to protect the individual
by prohibiting him from working longer than a certain number
of hours, while in Gillson the state sought to protect people from
purchasing more than they needed by denying A & P the right
to merchandise its goods in certain ways. In both cases Peckham
failed to detect a direct relation between the exercise of the police power and public health.
18. Id. a t 397-98, 17 N.E. a t 345, 72 N.Y.S. App. a t 821.
19. Id. a t 398-99, 17 N.E. a t 345, 72 N.Y.S. App. a t 821-22.
20. Id. a t 401, 17 N.E. a t 347, 72 N.Y.S. App. a t 823.
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The following year the court of appeals in People v. Budd21
followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Munn and upheld a statute prescribing a maximum charge for storing grain in
stationary elevators. Peckham's dissent was drawn from his ear. ~ discounting
~
lier unpublished opinion in People v. W ~ l s h In
the common law idea of "paternal government" expressed by the
great legal commentator Sir Matthew Hale, Peckham noted that
"all men, however great and however honest, are almost necessarily affected by the general belief of their times."23 Peckham recognized "a truer conception of the proper functions of governrnentef12'He disagreed with the majority's willingness to allow
the state to interfere with individual liberty-as he conceptualized it in Gillson-simply because the individual devotes his
property to a business in which the public is greatly interested,
or because the individual enjoys a monopoly by the fortuity that
~ uphold such legislahis property is conveniently s i t ~ a t e d . ' To
tion, warned Peckham, would be to encourage class warfare:
[I]n addition to the ordinary competition that exists throughout all industries, a new competition will be introduced, that of
competition for the possession of the government, so that legislative aid may be given to the class in possession thereof in its
contests with rival classes or interests in all sections and corners of the industrial world.g6

In conclusion, Peckham observed that the legislation was not
only "vicious," "communistic," and "inefficient," but illegal in
that it sought
to interfere with the lawful privileges of the individual to seek
and obtain such compensation as he can for the use of his own
property, where he neither asks nor receives from the sovereign
power any special right or immunity not given to and possessed
by every other citizen, and where he has not devoted his prop21. 117 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 670, 78 N.Y.S. App. 185 (1889).
22. 22 N.E. 682 (1889) (dissenting opinion of Judge Peckham incorporated into People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. a t 34-71, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t 197-210). Justice Gray concurred with
the views presented by Peckham in Walsh. He could see no protection against such "socialistic laws" if this act were sustained. He argued that "the theory of such legislation is
a startling departure from the true conception of governmental functions." Like
Peckham, he expressed his disapproval for legislation favoring particular classes. 117
N.Y. at 33, 22 N.E. at 681-82, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t 196 (Gray, J., dissenting).
23. 117 N.Y. at 47, 22 N.E. at 686, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t 201 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
24. Id., 22 N.E. at 687, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t 202.
25. Id. at 40, 22 N.E. at 684, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 199.
26. Id. at 68-69, 22 N.E. at 694, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 209.
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erty to any public use, within the meaning of the law.='
The elevator operator in Budd was the paradigmatic rugged
individual for Peckham. His monopoly was not acquired with
the help of government or combination, but by superior individualism. To enforce paternalistic legislation against such an individual would only involve government in class conflict. Peckham
was therefore not blind to the class struggles of his day; he was
merely denying government a role in that "normal human
activity."
Consistent with his conception of the judicial role, Peckham
dissented from the court's decision in Talcott v. City of Buff a 1 0 . ~In
~ Talcott the majority denied taxpayer standing to keep
the governing authorities of Buffalo from substituting electric
street lighting for gas lighting in certain sections of the city-an
official action within their power and discretion-without the required allegation of fraud, collusion, corruption, or bad faith.
Peckham believed that the exercise of judicial power to enjoin
the "squandering of public funds" by public officials would be
"exceedingly healthful."n He believed that the democratic election processes offered only a "slight deterrent effect" and afforded no redress for past reckless spending.'O As Peckham recognized (and the Warren Court later demonstrateds1), the
judicial identification of fundamental values and the enforcement of those values by an injunction effectively furthers an underlying premise of constitutionalism-that government should
be limited.
Peckham's final court of appeals opinion involving a conflict
between the exercise of police power and individual liberty was
handed down ten months before his nomination to the United
States Supreme Court. Writing for the court, Peckham sustained
the Consolidation Act of New York, which permitted the board
of health to direct owners of substandard tenements to install
adequate water supply facilities?%Judge Bartlett dissented, arguing that the statute placed unlimited power in the hands of
the board of health and thus unconstitutionally deprived the
27. Id. at 71, 22 N.E. at 695, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 210 (emphasis added).
28. 125 N.Y. 280, 26 N.E. 263, 86 N.Y.S. App. 975 (1891).
29. Id. at 289, 26 N.E. at 265, 86 N.Y.S. App. at 978 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 290, 26 N.E. at 265, 86 N.Y.S. App. at 978.
31. See 0.FISS,THECIVIL
RIGHTS
INJUNCTION (1978).
32. Health Dep't v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833, 106 N.Y.S.
App. 994 (1895).
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landlord of control over his pr~perty.~'Unlike his colleague,
Peckham had no difficulty envisioning a limit to such legislation.
He judicially amended the statute to substitute the judgment of
the judiciary for that of the board of health in the determination
of the adequacy of the required facilities? It was by this same
strategy that Peckham would eventually implement his WalshBudd position and thereby limit Munn v. Illinois.
Upon the death of Mr. Justice Jackson in 1895, President
Cleveland began the search for a replacement. Apparently ready
to do battle with Senator David Bennett Hill and his colleagues,
Cleveland once again offered a seat on the Court to William
Butler Hornblower, whose nomination had been defeated less
than two years earlier because of Senator Hill's opposition."
Hornblower declined the offer in early November,JBand shortly
afterward Cleveland wrote to Hill to determine whether Rufus
Peckham was acceptable?
New York Democrats had preferred Peckham over Hornblower to fill the earlier vacancy.s8 Senator Hill had even praised
him as one who "would make a magnificent member of the Supreme Court."ss Therefore, Hill offered no resistance to Rufus
Peckham, and Cleveland's nomination of Peckham on the third
of December40was confirmed by the Senate six days later." Apparently Peckham's conception of the role of the judiciary was
no obstacle to his securing a seat on the United States Supreme
Court.

Peckham's first opportunity to espouse his expanded notion
of individual liberty in the Supreme Court came in Allgeyer u.
L o u i ~ i a n aAllgeyer
.~~
tested the constitutionality of a state stat33. Id. at 53-54, 39 N.E. at 840-41, 106 N.Y.S. App. at 1001-02 (Bartlett, J.,
dissenting).
34. 145 N.Y. at 49-52, 39 N.E. at 839-40, 106 N.Y.S. App. at 1000-01.
35. See generally Pierce, A Vacancy on the Supreme Court: The Politics of Judicial Appointment 1893-94, 39 TENN.L. REV.555 (1972).
CLEVELAND
572 (1932).
36. A. NEVINS,
GROVER
37. LETTERS
OF GROVER
CLEVELAND
414-15 (A. Nevins ed. 1933).
38. Pierce, supra note 35, at 563.
39. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1894, at 1, col. 1.
40. 28 CONG.REC.25 (1895).
41. Id. at 90.
42. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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ute prohibiting individuals or brokers from procuring insurance
on property located in the state from any foreign corporation
that had not complied with state law. Though Peckham may be
accused of straining in Allgeyer to present his views on individual liberty and the judicial role by analyzing the statute's constitutionality according to "liberty of contract" rather than commerce clause principles, dicta in Peckham's Hopkins v. United
state^'^ opinion-which acknowledged congressional power to
regulate interstate transportation of a commodity but not the
stock certificate that represented that commodity-indicates
that more likely he did not consider an insurance policy to be an
article of interstate commerce.
Peckham declared that the Louisiana statute was repugnant
to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, explaining, as he had done in his first case of this type on the New York
Court of Appeals, that the liberty mentioned in the due process
clause comprehended not merely the right of the individual to
be free from physical restraint, but also included
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above menti~ned.~'

In keeping with his conception of the judicial role, Peckham refused to define the extent of this liberty vis-a-vis the police
power, reserving that question for each situation in which the
question arose. The view that had earlier found expression in
the Supreme Court only in the minority opinions of Justices
Field and Bradley was now expressed on behalf of the entire
Court by its newest member, Justice Peckham.
Although the Court expressed concern for the liberty of contract doctrine in Holden v. Hardy,4s it nevertheless-with
Peckham and Brewer in dissent-upheld a Utah statute prohibiting the employment of men in underground mines, smelters,
and ore or metal refineries for more than eight hours per day,
except in cases of emergency. The majority commenced with the
43. 171 U.S. 578, 597-98(1898).
44. 165 U.S. at 589.
45. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
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premise that the statute was presumptively constitutional and
concluded that there were "reasonable grounds" for the legislative determination that a restriction on hours of employment in
such an industry was necessary? But the need for state paternalism was not apparent to Peckham. Both Gillson and Lochner
demonstrate that for Peckham the presumption was against
such legislation, and it was incumbent upon the state to demonstrate a direct relation between the legislation and the end
sought.
In Lake Shore & Michigan Railway v.
the Court
was asked to determine whether the concededly valid power of
the Michigan Legislature to fix maximum rates for railroad fares
included the power to establish lower rates for persons who complied with certain conditions. The state asserted that the power
to lower rates in certain cases and to favor certain individuals
was inherent in its right to fix maximum rates.
Peckham, speaking for six members of the Court," rejected
the state's argument and held that the statute unreasonably interfered with the management of the company. The legislative
exercise was not simply a lesser right included in the power to
establish maximum rates. In exercising the power to establish
maximum rates, argued Peckham, the legislature acts for the
Thus, the right of the
public generally without discrimination.*@
legislature to enact rules and regulations for the general conduct
of the affairs of the company-relating, for example, to the
scheduling of trains and ticket office hours, and to the accommodations provided the public generally-was not at issue."O At issue was the legislature's power to interfere with the management
of the company by providing an exception from the legislatively
established general rates in favor of the wholesale buyer:
If the general power exist, then the legislature can direct the
company to charge smaller rates for clergymen or doctors, for
lawyers or farmers or school teachers, for excursions, for
church conventions, political conventions, or for all or any of
the various bodies that might desire to ride at any particular
time or to any particular place.61
Id. at 398.
173 U.S.684 (1899).
Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Gray and McKenna dissented.
173 U.S. at 691.
50. Id. at 693.
51. Id. at 694.

46.
47.
48.
49.
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Peckham again expressed his concern for legislation that could
increase class conflict in the exercise of legislative power. The
fact that the railroad discriminated in favor of certain classes
did not trouble Peckham. Persons had the right to contract to
do what no legislature could compel them to
In Peckham's final and most famous (or infamous) liberty of
, ~Court
~ invalidated,
contract decision, Lochner u. New Y ~ r kthe
by the narrowest of margins, a New York statute limiting bakery
employees to a ten-hour work day or sixty-hour work week. Unlike hstice Harlan in dissent, Peckham could find no "direct
relation" between this exercise of police power and public
health. What Peckham demanded of the state was the same information that would be presented to a legislative body:
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render
the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation,
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate
and legitimate . . . .

....
. . .[T]he limit of the police power has been reached and

...

no reasonable foundation for
passed in this case. There is
holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to
safeguard the public health or the health of the individuals
who are following the trade of a baker.*

In effect, Peckham was ordering the "Brandeis brief," and when
it was presented three years later in Muller v. Oregon," he voted
to sustain a similar ordinance applying to women. Thus, it is not
ironic or paradoxical that the brief submitted by Brandeis in
Muller relied exclusively on Lochner for law? By concentrating
on factual material, the Brandeis brief was merely recognizing
the judicial role defined by Peckham in Lochner.
This is not to deny that a significant distinction between
Lochner and Muller was that the statute involved in the latter
case sought to protect women rather than adult males. A sine
qua non of the brief of the party seeking the benefit of paternalId. at 697.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 57-58.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
See A. MASON,BRANDEIS:
A FREEMAN'SLIFE248-49 (1946). See also S. WOOD,
IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA125 (1968) (Muller said to discredit
CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Lochner).
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istic legislation in any case such as Lochner or Muller thus had
to be that it present to the judiciary evidence demonstrating
that the legislation involved bears a direct relation to a legitimate legislative end. It is possible that no case could have been
framed in 1905 that would have persuaded Peckham of the need
for legislation restricting the "liberty" of adult males. However,
any successful brief in support of legislation restricting the liberty of women to contract would have to demonstrate to the
Court the reasonableness of such legislation. The fact that women were involved may have made the burden of demonstrating
the need for the legislation an easy task; nevertheless, the presumption was against the constitutionality of such legislation.
The liberty of which Peckham spoke was much more than a
liberty to contract. It was the liberty to be free from the new
forms of legislative authority chat sought to restrict individual
freedoms in order to deal with the problems posed by the growth
of concentrated economic power. Moreover, as shown most
clearly in his opinions in Gillson, Budd, and Lake Shore &
Michigan Railway, Peckham conceptualized liberty as including
the concept of equality before the law. Legislation that discriminated among classes was presumptively void.
Liberty would not be assured by equal treatment before the
laws if equal opportunity was interfered with by combinations of
economic power. Thus, although Peckham's conception of liberty demanded that the Court resist legislative efforts to solve
the problems of the then rapidly changing world via paternalism, it demanded that the judiciary support legislative efforts to
enjoin the growth of corporate power.

IV. THESHERMAN
ANTI-TRUST
ACT
Peckham took his seat on the Court precisely one year after
its first effort to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.57In
United States u. E. C. Knightw the Court, marking a clear line
between manufacturing and commerce, refused to block the sale
of four Philadelphia sugar refineries to the American Sugar Refining Co. One year after taking his seat, Peckham began breathing life into the federal government's effort to check monopolies
and concentrations of economic power.
Peckham's sympathy for the government's antitrust efforts
57. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. $5 1-7 (1976)).
58. 156 U.S.1 (1895).
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seems discordant with his attempts to curtail the growth of legislative power. But this discord is relieved by recognizing that
judicial efforts to stem the growth of legislative power were motivated by a desire to safeguard individual liberty. Threats to
individual liberty arose also from the growth of corporate power.
When the legislature responded to the changing industrial world
by attacking the corporate entity rather than restricting individual freedoms, it had an ally on the Court.
In United States u. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso~iation,~~
the Court followed Peckham's lead and voted five to four to apply the Sherman Act to dissolve a freight association formed to
establish and maintain reasonable rates, rules, and regulations.
Peckham rejected the argument that the Act only prohibited
"unreasonable" restraints of trade and found it to prohibit all
restraints of trade.60 Writing for 'the dissent, Justice White argued that Peckham's reading of the Act not only violated the
common law tradition, but reason as well:
[Tlhe decision, substantially, is that the act of Congress is a
departure from the general principles of law, and by its terms
destroys the right of the individuals or corporations to enter
into very many reasonable contracts. . . . [Tlhis proposition
. . is tantamount to an assertion that the act of Congress is
itself ~nreasonable.~~

.

The first half of the minority's opinion repeatedly confronted
Peckham with the apparent inconsistency between his reading of
the Act and the liberty of the citizen?'
Peckham's response was rooted in his belief in the value of
the rugged individual and in his suspicion of concentrated economic power. He warned against permitting businesses to combine their economic power, since their ultimate purpose was
to control the production or manufacture of any particular article in the market, and by such control dictate the price at
which the article shall be sold, the effect being to drive out of
business all the small dealers in the commodity and to render
the public subject to the decision of the combination as to
what price shall be paid for the article.6s
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

166 U.S. 290 (1897).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 344 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 344-45, 355-56.
166 U.S. at 323-24.
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In Peckham's view it was not in the interest of the country to
transform "small but independent dealers who were familiar
with the business and who had spent their lives in it, and who
supported themselves and their families from the small profits
realized therein" into "mere servant[s] or agent[s] of a
corp~ration."~~
Not only could Peckham find no distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade,B"e
could find
nothing in the legislative history of the Act or the nature of railroad companies to exclude them from the Act's coverage." In
fact, Peckham reasoned, considering the public character of such
corporations-the privileges and franchises they receive from
the public and the nexus between transportation rates and public ~oncern~~-railroadcompanies were the paradigmatic corporation meant to be regulated by the Act:
[wlhile, in the absence of a statute prohibiting them, contracts
of private individuals or corporations touching upon restraints
in trade must be unreasonable in their nature to be held void,
different considerations obtain in the case of public corporations like those of railroads where it well may be that any restraint upon a business of that character as affecting its rates
of transportation must thereby be prejudicial to the public
intere~ts."~

Peckham's response to the dilemma outlined by White was
no illuminating beacon to contemporary observers. What illumination it did provide was clouded by his earlier opinion in Allgeyer, handed down in the same month as Trans-Missouri
Freight. However, Peckham was given the opportunity to clarify
his position in United States v. Joint Traffic Associati~n,~~
which sustained the government's use of the Sherman Act
against an association of railroad companies. One argument
presented by the minority in Trans-Missouri Freight, but not
addressed by Peckham, was that all contracts restrained trade
and therefore if no distinction was made between reasonable and
unreasonable restraints, all such contracts were void.'O In Joint
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 324.
at 328, 332-33.
at 319-20, 324-25.
at 335.
at 334.
171 U.S. 505 (1898).
166 U.S. at 351-52 (White, J., dissenting).
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Traffic Peckham stood by his earlier position, denying that the
Act drew any such distinction, and added that the Act applied
only "to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a
restraint upon interstate comrner~e."~'
Peckham could see no inconsistency between his decision in
Joint Traffic and his support of the general constitutional right
of the citizen to make contract^.^^ The argument based on liberty of contract had no relevance because the contract was an
illegal one, and there was no right to enter into an illegal
contract:
The citizen may have the right to make a proper (that is, a
lawful) contract, one which is also essential and necessary for
carrying out his lawful purposes. The question which arises
here is, whether the contract is a proper or lawful one, and we
have not advanced a step towards its solution by saying that
the citizen is protected by the Fifth, or any other amendment,
in his right to make proper contracts to enable him to carry
out his lawful p~rposes.'~

Peckham's reasoning was, of course, circular: the contract was
illegal only if the restriction on liberty of contract was legitimate. Thus the question was whether the statute was a legitimate exercise of congressional power over interstate c~mmerce.~'
Peckham answered in the affirmative:
[Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce] extends at
least to the prohibition of contracts relating to interstate commerce, which would extinguish all competition between otherwise competing railroad corporations, and which would in that
way restrain interstate trade or commerce. We do not think,
when the grantees of this public franchise are competing railroads seeking the business of transportation of men and goods
from one State to another, that ordinary freedom of contract in
the use and management of their property requires the right to
combine as one consolidated and powerful association for the
purpose of stifling competition among themselves, and of thus
keeping their rates and charges higher than they might otherwise be under the laws of competition. And this is so, even
though the rates provided for in the agreement may for the
time be not more than are reasonable. They may easily and a t
71.
72.
73.
74.

171 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
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any time be increased. It is the combination of these large and
powerful corporations, covering vast sections of territory and
influencing trade throughout the whole extent thereof, and acting as one body in all the matters over which the combination
extends, that constitutes the alleged evil, and in regard to
which, so far as the combination operates upon and restrains
interstate commerce, Congress has power to legislate and to
pr~hibit.'~

The notion that combinations are evil regardless of whether
rates may be reasonable or even understated is quite consistent
with Peckham's master idea.
Two types of business associations not interfering with interstate commerce, and therefore not within the purview of the
antitrust provisions, were identified by Peckham in two other
decisions delivered the same day as Joint Traffic. The first,
Hopkins v. United States,16 involved an association of
merchants who sold cattle on commission. The second, Anderson v. United States,77 involved a similar group of associated
cattle purchasers. Not only did Peckham fail to detect a direct
impact on interstate commerce from these associations, but he
considered neither association a novel combination threatening
the i n d i v i d ~ a l . ~ ~
In Hopkins the government unsuccessfully employed a
unique variation of the liberty of contract argument. A section
of the employment agreement prohibited the employment of any
agent, solicitor, or employee except upon a stipulated salary not
contingent upon the commissions earned, and further provided
that no more than three solicitors could be employed at one
time. The government argued that this section of the agreement
was an infringement of the constitutional right of each association member to make lawful contracts in furtherance of his business." The right of individuals to voluntarily contract to restrict
their own actions was the essence of liberty of contract for
Peckham, and was distinguishable from legislative efforts to restrict the actions of individuals. Peckham observed:
To say that a State would not have the right to prohibit a defendant from employing as many solicitors as he might choose,
75. Id. at 570-71.
76. 171 U.S. 587 (1898).
77. 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
78. Id. at 616-17.
79. 171 U.S. at 600.
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proves nothing in regard to the right of individuals to agree
upon that subject in a way which they may think the most conducive to their own interesk80

Peckham was never more explicit in his treatment of liberty
of contract vis-a-vis antitrust regulation than in Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United state^.^' Six corporations engaging in the
manufacture, sale, and transportation of iron pipe were accused
of violating the Sherman Act because of collusive bidding on
contracts to sell and deliver pipe to out-of-state customers. The
application of the Sherman Act rested on the finding that the
corporations' activities had a direct and immediate impact on
E. C. Knight was readily distinguished in
interstate ~ornmerce.~'
that the instant case involved selling and delivery rather than
It was further held that a total monopoly
mere manufact~ring.~~
was not necessary in order to find a combination to be in restraint of trade and thus violative of the Sherman Act?'
More important for purposes of this study is Peckham's
treatment of the corporations' argument that the constitutional
guarantee of liberty of contract operated as a limitation on the
power of Congress to regulate commerce." The implication of
the circular reasoning in Joint Traffic was made explicit: Congress' commerce power was "more important" than each individual's liberty of contract.86Therefore, the congressional authority
was a legitimate limitation on that individual liberty." Peckham
believed that the opposite holding would result in a lack of uniformity between different states, as well as an increase in the
cost and a corresponding decrease in the predictability of antitrust litigation?
For present purposes, Peckham's final two antitrust opinions add very little. Both cases employed the direct-indirect test.
In Bement v. National Harrow C O . ,the
~ ~ Sherman Act was set
up as a defense in a suit for breach of contract in relation to the
manufacture and sale of an item patented by the plaintiff.
80. Id. at 603.
81. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
82. Id. at 238, 240-41.
83. Id. at 242.
84. Id. at 244-45.
85. See id. at 227.
86. See id. at 230.
87. See id. at 229.
88. Id. at 231-33.
89. 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
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Peckham rejected the defense, noting that the very object of the
patent laws of the United States is monopoly.B0Although interstate commerce was directly affected, Peckham observed that
the antitrust law had no application to a situation where reasonable and legal conditions restricting the terms upon which the
patented article could be used and the price to be demanded for
it were imposed upon the assignee of a patent by the owner.
In Montague & Co. v. Lowry,@'the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
was successfully asserted as a defense by a private business suffering from the price-fixing of an association of tile and fireplace
fixtures manufacturers and dealers. Following Addyston Pipe,
Peckham placed the association within the ambit of the Sherman Act.
The most troubling piece of the Peckham puzzle is Northern Securities Co. v. United States?' Because Peckham gave no
reasons for his refusal to join the majority in applying the Sherman Act against a holding company formed to combine two railroad lines, his position will never be understood with complete
certainty. His decision to join Holmes' incredible dissenting
opinionsa-which misread Peckham's earlier opinions and conceptualized the Sherman Act as a minor criminal statutes4-is
beyond explanation. However, if one accepts the probable justification for Peckham's reliance on liberty of contract rather than
on the commerce clause in Allgeyert it is possible to understand his decision to also join with White in his refusal to accept
the view that a stock transaction involved an article of interstate
commerce.*
90. Id. at 91.
91. 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
92. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
93. Id. at 400-11 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. See D. Steward, The Fuller Court and the Sherman Act 55 (March 1978) (unpublished article in Yale Law School Library).
95. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
96. See 193 U.S. at 368-69 (White, J., dissenting). Another perplexing piece of the
Peckham puzzle is Peckham's voting record in the race-relations cases. Although not
textually relevant here because of the focus on cases involving government regulation of
the marketplace, it is reasonable to apply the thesis to other matters and wonder why
the champion of individual liberty and limited government lent his support to the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). If Peckham believed legislation that discriminated among classes to be presumptively void, how could he abide a state statute
that required separate railway coaches for black and white passengers? One is again
forced to speculate, since Peckham did not explain his position. The equality of which
Peckham spoke was equality of opportunity and equality before the law, not equality of
outcome. The majority opinion in Plessy asserted that a "statute which implies merely a
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Peckham was the mirror image of the Populist.@'The Populist uniformly reacted against monopoly. Peckham, on the other
hand, had a certain tolerance for monopoly that resulted from
rugged individualism. During Peckham's tenure on the Court,
however, it was becoming increasingly clear that the momentum
against monopoly was too great for Peckham's approach, and by
1909 the New York judge who was well known for his activist
conception of the judicial role in defense of individual liberty,
legal distinction . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races." Id.
a t 543. If Peckham viewed the statute as "merely a legal distinction" rather than a
breach of equality before the law, it is possible that he viewed the petitioner's request as
an attempt to urge the judiciary itself to tread where government ought not go. Government was powerless to eradicate racial instincts. Id. at 551. Thus, although the statute in
question was enacted only six years earlier, it may have been viewed as affirming the
natural order, while judicial intervention may have been viewed as an unwelcome governmental interference.
However, such an explanation may not suffice to explain Peckham's vote to support
the majority in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), which upheld a state
statute prohibiting interracial education even where pupils with parental consent chose
to sit together. Unlike the Plessy situation, there was no conflict of liberties between the
parties directly involved. Because of the impact of integration on the larger social structure, Peckham may have perceived a clash of liberties. What was the principled distinction between the right of the individuals involved in Berea College to associate and the
right of the employer and employee in Lochner to contract? Was the latter perceived as
the more "basic" right?
Was government by judiciary again seen as too obtrusive by Peckham in Cummings
v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), which sanctioned the use of
public funds to support a white high school while assistance to a black high school was
suspended for economic reasons? For a unanimous Court, Harlan seems to have prophetically realized the extreme danger of federal judicial intervention in the management of a
school system. Id. at 545.
Similar reasoning may explain how Peckham could hope to preserve individual liberty by voting with the majority in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). In Giles the
Court denied federal jurisdiction to compel state boards of registrars to enroll black voters who desired to vote in a forthcoming congressional election. Justice Holmes, writing
for the Court, observed that unless the courts were willing to supervise the election process, the only thing the plaintiff could receive in a court of equity would be an empty
promise: "Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if
done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or
by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States." Id.
a t 488.
Finally, how could the great spokesman for liberty of contract join the majority in
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which denied federal jurisdiction over conspiracies to prevent blacks from making or carrying out labor contracts and agreements.
From Peckham's frame of reference, Hodges is easily distinguished from Lochner: Liberty of contract was meant to serve as a check on government power, and Hodges involved interference by private individuals.
97. See T. Powers, United States v. E. C. Knight: The Problem of the People's
Party and the Antitrust Policy (June 1978) (unpublished article in Yale Law School Library), for a description of Populist reaction to the monopoly issue.
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had become-and continues to be-the object of severe criticism
by legal scholars. The progressive theory of government was in
vogue, and Peckham's theory was an anachronism. His notion of
liberty, one violated by legislation discriminating among classes,
was gradually giving way to a notion of liberty violated by the
gross inequity among ~ l a s s e s . ~

-

-

98. See generally J. POLE,THEPURSUIT
OF EQUALITY
IN AMERICAN
HISTORY
(1978).

